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INDEPENDENT POLITICAL COMMITTEES
AND THE FEDERAL ELECTION LAWS
In political election campaigns, persons or organizations can
help finance a candidate in two basic ways. They can make their
own expenditures for the candidate's benefit or they can make con-
tributions to others-such as the candidate himself-who can spend
the money on the candidate's behalf.' In 1974, Congress amended
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) 2 to limit such expendi-
tures for a candidate 3 and to reinstate limitations on contribu-
tions 4 The Supreme Court undertook a broad review of the
FECA in the landmark decision of Buckley v. Valeo5 and there,
for purposes of the first amendment, distinguished contributions
from expenditures made independently of a candidate.6 The Court
reasoned that although all spending of money in the political arena
-where communication is so costly-is equivalent to speech, the
direct expression by the person spending the funds deserves greater
' See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)-(9) (Supp. III 1979), defining the terms "contribu-
tion" and "expenditure."
2 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
88 Stat. 1263 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FECA 1974] (amending Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
FECA 1971] and Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, titles 7-8, 85 Stat. 560
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Revenue Act]).
3FECA 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §101(e)(1), 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (re-
pealed, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976)). The section had provided that
"[n]o person may make any expenditure ... relative to a clearly identified candi-
date during a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures made by
such person during the year advocating the election or defeat of such candidate,
exceeds $1,000." Id. The statute has always defined "person" as "an individual,
partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor organization, and any other
organization or group of persons... . FECA 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 301(h),
86 Stat. 3 (1972) (currently found at 2 U.S.C. § 431(11) (Supp. 11 1979)).
4 The Hatch Act of 1939, entitled "An Act to prevent pernicious political activi-
ties," Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), as amended by Pub. L. No. 76-743,
54 Stat. 767 (1940), established contribution limitations of $5,000 per calendar year
to any candidate for federal office. Pub. L. No. 76-743, § 13(a), 54 Stat. 767
(1940) (codified before repeal at 18 U.S.C. § 608) (repealed, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
§201(a), 90 Stat. 475 (1976)). It remained essentially intact until 1971, when
its provisions on contribution limitations were dropped by FECA 1971. Pub. L.
No. 92-225, § 203, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). In 1974, however, contribution restrictions
were reinstated by amendments to the FECA: individual contributions to a candi-
date in a calendar year were limited to $1,000. FECA 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
§ 101(b), 88 Stat 1263 (1974). The restriction thus matched the newly added
expenditure limitation. See note 3 supra.
5424 U.S. 1 (1976).
6 Id. 19-21.
(955)
956 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
protection than does the contribution of money to others to spend
on a campaign. 7 Consequently, the Court held unconstitutional
the FECA's limitations on independent campaign expenditures,8
while it upheld the limitations on contributions.9
The Court's holding significantly altered the functioning of the
regulatory scheme established by the federal election laws. In the
early 1970s, on the tide of a rising demand for election reform, Con-
gress took successive steps to prevent corruption in presidential
election campaigns by revising the federal election laws.'0 Start-
ing with bills that placed limits on campaign contributions, but
not on expenditures made for the benefit of a candidate, legislators
foresaw that a failure to restrict expenditures would enable indi-
viduals and groups who had reached their limits on contributions
to simply run their own parallel campaigns for the candidates they
support.1 Congress therefore, in passing the 1974 FECA amend-
ments, limited the expenditures that could be made on behalf of a
candidate. 12 Buckley struck down that provision, however, thereby
opening an "expenditure loophole" in the FECA.
Within fifty days after the decision was announced, 3 Con-
gress amended the election laws to correct the constitutional errors
7 Id. For general discussions of the Court's decision, see Posby, Buckley v.
Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 Sup. Cr. REv. 1 (1976);
Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
8 424 U.S. at 51.
9 Id. 29.
10 Beginning in 1971, Congress provided for the establishment of public funding
for presidential general election campaigns (the scheme would not be fully effective
until after the 1972 election), and for tax incentives to encourage small contribu-
tions to candidates. Revenue Act, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 701-703, 9001-9013, 85
Stat. 560 (1971). In 1972, Congress enacted broad reporting and disclosure require-
ments pertaining to all campaign financing. FECA 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225,
§§ 301-311, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). In 1974, further changes were made to complete
the scheme. Among these were the extension of the public financing concept to
presidential primary elections, reinstatement of contribution limitations, and the
addition of restrictions on independent expenditures. FECA 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-443, §§ 101-103, 408, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
11 The Senate Rules and Administration Committee, in its report on the FECA
Amendments of 1974, stated:
Whether campaigns are funded privately or publicly such controls [on
independent expenditures] are imperative if Congress is to enact meaningful
limits on direct contributions. Otherwise, wealthy individuals limited to a
$3,000 direct contribution could also purchase one hundred thousand
dollars' worth of advertisements for a favored candidate. Such a loophole
would render direct contribution limits virtually meaningless.
S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONe. & An. NEws 5587, 5604.
'2 See note 3 supra.
13 The Supreme Court, having invalidated certain features of the Federal Elec-
tion Commission's constitution, granted a stay of its decision with regard to the
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found by the Court.1 4 Despite congressional attempts to narrow
as much as possible the newly created right to make independent
expenditures, 5 problems soon arose. This Comment examines, in
the context of presidential general election campaigns,", the issues
arising from this revised treatment of independent expenditures.
The major objections to the expenditure loophole in the presi-
dential general election context stem from the fact that political
committees purporting t9 be independent may raise and spend large
sums of money in support of a candidate, thereby running a cam-
authority of the Commission for a period of 30 days. 424 U.S. at 144. The stay
was later extended an additional 20 days. S. REP'. No. 677, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
61 (1976).
14 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283,
90 Stat. 475 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FECA 1976], as amended by Federal
Election Campaign Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat 1339 (1980).
15 The House Committee on House Administration, in its report on the proposed
1976 FECA amendments, included among the purposes of the bill the following:
[P]rior to 1971 the laws regulating Federal campaigns permitted an infinite
proliferation of political committees which were ostensibly separate entities
but which were in fact a means for advancing a candidate's campaign.
That deficiency brought the campaign laws into disrepute and provided an
essential predicate for the 1971 and 1974 reforms that the Congress enacted.
Buckley v. Valeo's invalidation of the limitations placed by the 1971 Act,
as amended, on individual expenditures and on candidate expenditures
promises a repetition of the pre-1971 experience. To prevent that result,
while safeguarding the full enjoyment of the First Amendment right of
individuals and groups to make expenditures for political expression, H.R.
12406 contains a series of prophylactic measures. These are directed solely
at requiring full reporting and disclosure by individuals and groups that
make "independent expenditures" (a term defined in the bill in conformity
with the Buckley Court's definition); and at placing several additional
limitations akin to those upheld by the Court on the amount that may be
contributed by or to a political committee.
H.R. REP. No. 917, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976), reprinted in FzmiuxL ErLoEro
CoMmssioN, LEcisLArrv' HIsToRY or FEDEmL ELcnON CAMPAIGN ACT AamEN-
icmTSs or 1976, at 797, 805 (1977).
FECA 1976 narrowly defined an "independent expenditure" as an
expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate which is made without cooperation or consulta-
tion with any candidate, or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate, and which is not made in concert with, or at the request or
suggestion of, any candidate or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate.
FECA 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 102(g), 90 Stat. 475 (1976) (currently found
at 2 U.S.C. §431(17) (Supp. 1111980)).
16 Although this Comment, like the cases with which it deals, primarily ad-
dresses the activities of independent committees during the presidential general
election, similar provisions also apply to candidates who accept public funding in
the primaries. See LR.C. §§ 9031-9042. The election laws relating to campaigns for
congressional seats also will not be discussed here, except as such references may
be relevant to the more general issues raised by the expenditures of independent,
multicandidate political committees.
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paign parallel to that of the candidate's authorized campaign. As-
suming the candidate has accepted public financing,1'7 his official
committees are expressly disallowed from accepting private contri-
butions, and are expressly limited in the amount they can spend;
the unofficial and unconnected committee working for the candi-
date's election knows no such limits. At least three congressional
objectives in passing the public financing and regulatory system
are potentially impaired by the operation of parallel campaigns: the
prevention of corruption or its appearance, s the institution of
some form of rough parity in spending for major candidates,19 and
the protection of the overall regulatory scheme.20
In 1976, the first presidential election in which the public
funding scheme applied, the level of activity by independent po-
litical committees was relatively insignificant.21 This resulted at
least partly from uncertainty about the new rules.22 By June 1980,
however, at least five separate independent 23 groups were organized,
with plans to spend collectively from $38 million to $58 million in
support of Ronald Reagan, the likely Republican presidential
nominee at that time.24 Because the Presidential Election Cam-
paign Fund Act (Fund Act) would limit each major party candidate
to receiving $29.4 million from the Treasury for their campaigns, 25
the projected spending by these independent committees appeared
17 For an overview of the public financing system and related regulations, see
notes 66-98 infra & accompanying text.
'8 See note 118 infra & accompanying text.
19 See notes 123 & 223 infra & accompanying text.
2 0 See notes 121 & 122 infra & accompanying text.
21 The reported independent expenditures on behalf of Gerald Ford's candidacy
were only $216,715; expenditures on behalf of Jimmy Carter totalled an even less
significant $74,298. H. A xANm, FiN.uciNG THE 1976 ErLEcTorN 408, 363
(1979).
22 Id. 363-65, 407-10.
2 3 Although this Comment will attempt to raise questions concerning the true
independence of these groups, it will refer to them throughout as "independent
political committees" because that is how they are popularly known.
24 N.Y. Times, July 2, 1980, at A17, col. 5.
25 I.R.C. §§9003(b)(1), 9004(a)(1). These sections refer to the FECA for
determining the actual contribution limits. That Act provides for $20 million in
public financing for major-party candidates, as adjusted with inflation. 2 U.S.C.
§441a(b)(1)(B), 441a(c) (1976). The Act also provides that each party's
national committee can spend an additional amount over and above this year's $29.4
million figure, determined as a function of the voting age population. 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(d) (1976). In 1980, that amount was $4.7 million. N.Y. Times, June 23,
1980, at A21, col. 3.
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capable of creating a significant disparity in spending between the
campaigns of nominees Reagan and Carter.
28
Several legal actions were instituted in response to these cir-
cumstances. In Common Cause v. Schmitt,27 the plaintiff public
interest group initially filed suit against one of the independent
committees, Americans For Change, and later added two other
committees as defendants. 28 In its two-count complaint, Common
Cause charged, first, that it was unlawful under the statute for the
committees to spend more than $1000 on Reagan's behalf, regardless
of whether they were truly independent of Reagan's official cam-
paign organization; alternatively, it charged that the committees
could not spend more than that amount because, as a factual mat-
ter, they were not independent. 9 The Federal Election Commis-
sion (FEC or Commission) brought a separate action against Ameri-
cans For Change, making -the same charge as in the first count of
the Common Cause complaint; the actions were subsequently con-
solidated.30 Both plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the defendant committees. Both suits were unsuccessful,
but have been appealed to the Supreme Court, which has noted
probable jurisdiction. 1 In a related action, the Carter-Mondale
Reelection Committee (Carter-Mondale) filed a complaint on July
2, 1980 with the FEC, requesting, inter alia, that the Commission
decline to certify Reagan for public funding in the general election
on the ground that because of the activities of the "allegedly in-
dependent committees," the Fund Act and the FECA would be
violated if Reagan should seek and receive public funding.3 2 Two
26 N.Y. Times, June 23, 1980, at A21, col 3.
Another source of potentially serious spending imbalances, the corporate or
labor political action committee, is considered at notes 194-205 infra & accompanying
text.
27 No. 80-1609 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1980), prob. iuris. noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3616
(U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-847).
2 8 Plaintiff's Opening Brief on the Merits at 8, Common Cause v. Schmitt, No.
80-1609 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1980), prob. juris. noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3616 (U.S. Feb.
24, 1981) (No. 80-847).
29 Id. 24, 50.
30 FEC v. Americans for Change, No. 80-1754 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1980), prob.
furis. noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3616 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-1067), consolidated
for decision with Common Cause v. Schmitt. The FEC intervened as a defendant
in the Common Cause suit, arguing that the plaintiff's complaint there should be
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
3149 U.S.L.W. 3616 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981).
32 Complaint at 2, Carter-Mondale Reelection Comm., Inc. v. Reagan (certifica-
tion granted by the FEC July 24, 1980), af'd, No. 80-1842 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 12,
1980). Alternatively, the complaint requested that the Commission commence an
investigation into possible violations of the election laws by the committees. Id. 39.
19811
960 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
weeks later, Ronald Reagan officially received the Republican nom-
ination for President, and after filing the requisite papers, was cer-
tified to receive payments under the Fund Act. Immediately there-
after, Carter-Mondale filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, seeking reversal of the FEC
certification decision. The appeal was not successful.33
Although the feared huge disparity in funding did not ma-
terialize3 4 the questions posed by these cases remain relevant today.
How can or should Congress and the courts regulate purportedly
independent political committees in a way that preserves the in-
tegrity of the federal election laws without violating the constitu-
tional rights of these groups and their members? Can the funds
collected and expended by these groups be directly limited, re-
gardless of whether the groups are independent? What can private
litigants do to challenge and control expenditures by non-inde-
pendent committees? Part I of this Comment provides some fac-
tual background on the nature of the independent political commit-
tees that supported then-candidate Reagan in the 1980 election.
Part II discusses the recent cases in terms of the possible strategies
they suggest for controlling the committees. This part concludes,
first, that because of Buckley the district court in Common Cause
properly held unconstitutional a statutory restriction on expendi-
tures by political committees. Second, it concludes that the only
action available during a campaign to challenge "independent"
expenditures, filing a complaint with the FEC, is an empty remedy
because the Commission's investigation almost certainly will con-
tinue beyond election day, and the sanctions available to the Com-
mission or courts at that time will be inadequate to properly
redress a violation of the Act. Part III suggests that the im-
pact that these committees have on presidential elections may be
reduced by permitting contributions directly to the candidate dur-
ing the general election, and by raising the limitation on individual
contributions to candidates. 35
33 Carter-Mondale Reelection Comm., Inc. v. FEC, No. 80-1842 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 12, 1980).
34 See notes 43-45 and 48-50 infra & accompanying text.
35This Comment will focus on the independent committees that supported
President Reagan rather than those that supported President Carter because of the
enormous disparity in their respective levels of expenditures, and, consequently, the
disparity in the amount of information (from the media) available on the two groups
of committees. The former group outspent the latter group by about 100 to 1:
according to the New York Times, pro-Reagan committees spent $10 million as
,opposed to expenditures by pro-Carter committees of $0.1 million. Smith, Financing
Campaign '80: Would You Believe Half a Billion?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1980, at
E3, col. I.
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: THE INDEPENDENT
PoLrniCAL COMMITEE
The plaintiff's brief in Common Cause v. Schmitt 36 described
the independent committees as "centrally managed organizations
that solicit contributions broadly but place control over how the
money will be spent in the hands of a few persons-generally poli-
tical professiontls." 37 The 1980 committees "operate[d] large, pro-
fessionally run'. purportedly 'independent' partisan campaigns on
behalf of" Reagan and other Republican candidates for federal
office.38 The brief's description seems reasonably accurate3 0
As of July 1980, there were at least five committees, listed below,
planning to support Reagan with independent expenditures. 40 Col-
lectively, these groups estimated that they would spend at least $38
million on the campaign 41 The largest of these groups in terms of
spending expectations was Americans for Change (AFC), which
announced a goal of raising and spending $20-$30 million. 42 The
money would be spent on a combination of television, radio, and
newspaper ads, and direct mailings to voters.
The independent groups' actual spending, however, fell far
below their expectations. By October 31, 1980, five days before the
election, the FEC's preliminary figures showed expenditures on the
presidential election by all independent committees to be $10.7
million. 43 As of October 31, 1980, the leading spenders in all
races were as follows:
36Plaintiff's Opening Brief on the Merits, Common Cause v. Schmitt, No. 80-
1609 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1980), prob. juris. noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3616 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1981) (No. 80-847).
37 Id. 47.
38 Id. 7. Apparently, no comparable committee action took place to help
Carter. See Wall St. J., June 19, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
39 See notes 40-59 infra & accompanying text.
40 N.Y. Times, July 2, 1980, at A17, col. 5. By the middle of the month there
were at least seven groups. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1980, at B9, col. 2.
41 N.Y. Times, July 2, 1980, at A17, col. 5.
42 Wall St. J., June 19, 1980, at 1, col. 1. By the middle of September, how-
ever, after the Common Cause litigation had taken place, AFC's fundraising expecta-
tions had been lowered significantly. Claiming that "the Court battle has interfered
with our efforts and obviously has had a chilling effect on our fundraising activi-
ties . . . ," AFC reported in September that it had raised $300,000. Its revised
plan was to raise a total of $345 million, to be spent primarily on a "voter kit
program" and newspaper and electronic media advertising. AFC Progress Report
(Sept. 5, 1980) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review); tele-
phone interview with Maria Dennison, AFC Press Secretary (Sept 10, 1980).
43 Press Release, Federal Election Commission (Oct 31, 1980) (on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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National Conservative Political Action
Committee $4 million
Congressional Club $3 million
Fund for a Conservative Majority $2 million
Americans for an Effective Presidency $0.8 million
Americans for Change $0.5 million"
Much of the shortfall was blamed on the Common Cause, FEC, and
Carter-Mondale litigation.45 Although the negative publicity gen-
erated by this litigation probably did have a chilling effect on fund-
raising, much of the shortfall is probably equally attributable to the
unrealistic expectations of the committees, especially the newer ones.
The committees raised their money primarily through direct
mail solicitations of individuals, who may contribute up to $5000
to any political committee,46 and through the sponsorship of various
fundraising events. The groups traded directly upon the inability
of the candidates to receive contributions once they accepted federal
funding. Consider, for example, an excerpt from one of the AFC
brochures: "Federal Law Prohibits Ronald Reagan from accepting
your personal contribution. But.... ." The brochure proceeded to
explain how the reader could legally support Ronald Reagan's
candidacy by contributing to the AFC committee.
47
As a result of the importance of the direct mail solicitations,
the control of mailing lists became crucial. The New York Times
reported that Reagan's primary campaign relied heavily on funds
collected through mail solicitations of small contributors:
The fountainhead of Mr. Reagan's mail drive was a
list of 180,000 names left over from his unsuccessful 1976
Presidential campaign. The list became the property of
Citizens for the Republic ["CFTR"], an organization
started by Mr. Reagan and his aides as a fund-raising vehi-
cle for conservative causes. The Citizens for the Re-
44 Id.
4 5 See, e.g., AFC Progress Report, supra note 42. See also Ifshin & Warin,
Litigating the 1980 Presidential Election, at 35 (1980) (unpublished article on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
482 U.S.C. §441a(a)(1)(C) (1976). By contrast, an individual may not
contribute more than $1,000 directly to any candidate and his or her authorized
committees with respect to any election for federal office, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1) (A)
(1976), with the exception of course that one may not contribute anything in the
general election to a major-party presidential candidate who has accepted public
funding. LR.C. § 9003(b). An individual is allowed to contribute up to $25,000
in a calendar year. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (1976).
4 7 Campaign literature of Americans for Change (on file with the University
of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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public's list, in turn, has been rented in a growing
mailing-list market to a wide array of conservative groups,
including the Fund for a Conservative Majority.48
Other private organizations controlling their own conservative mail-
ing lists also made their lists available to several of the independent
committees.4 9 By becoming increasingly reliant on the same mail-
ing lists, however, it is possible that the committees approached the
saturation point on individual contributions-at least, that might
help to explain why the newer committees that did not have their
own lists did not raise more funds than they did.80
Each of the five committees filed with the FEC as multicandi-
date committees, and none filed as "authorized" committees of the
Reagan campaign. Three of the committees-Fund for a Conserva-
tive Majority, North Carolina Congressional Club, and National
Conservative Political Action Committee-had been organized in
the early 1970s, thus substantially pre-dating the 1980 Reagan cam-
paign. Several of the groups formed projects with such names as
"Reagan for President in '80," "Citizens for Reagan in '80," and
"Americans for Reagan." I" They could not file their committees
under such tides because the FECA prevents them from so using
the candidate's name.
2
Most of the committees explicitly told their contributors that
an executive committee within the group would make all decisions
on expenditures. 3  The executive committees were all controlled
by political professionals-people with longstanding ties to the Re-
publican Party or to the candidate himself. Americans For Change,
for example, was headed by Republican Senators Harrison H.
Schmitt of New Mexico and David Durenberger of Minnesota;
John Harmer, the former Lieutenant Governor of California under
then-Governor Reagan, and Carl T. Curtis, a former Republican
48 N.Y. Times, June 30, 1980, at B13, col 1.
49 July 15, 1980, Supplement to Complaint at 4, Carter-Mondale Reelection
Comm., Inc. v. Reagan (certification granted by the FEC July 24, 1980), aff'd,
No. 80-1842 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 12, 1980).
50 Telephone interview with Professor Herbert Alexander (Jan. 6, 1981).
51Plaintiff Federal Election Commission's Local Rule 1-9(h) Statement of
Material Facts As to Which There is No Genuine Dispute [hereinafter cited as
FEC's Statement of Material Facts], FEC v. Americans For Change, No. 80-1754
(D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1980), prob. juris. noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3616 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1981)
(No. 80-1067).
522 U.S.C. §432(e)(4) (Supp. M 1979).
53 See, e.g., campaign literature of Americans for Change (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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Senator from Nebraska. 4 Republican Senator Jesse Helms of North
Carolina was the Honorary Chairman of Americans For Reagan, a
project of the North Carolina Congressional Club (NCCC). The
organizers of Americans for an Effective Presidency (AEP), a group
planning to spend $12-15 million (but eventually spending only
$.8 million), included Thomas Reed, co-chairman of Reagan's 1970
campaign for Governor of California; Peter Flanigan, a member of
the Advisory Council on Economic Affairs of the Republican Na-
tional Committee; James Lake, the coordinator of Reagan's primary
campaign in New Hampshire in 1976, and Stuart Spencer, who ran
Reagan's campaigns for Governor of California in 1966 and 1970
and who subsequently would leave AEP to join Reagan's official
campaign staff.55
Although by law independent committees are prevented from
coordinating their activities with the candidate or his authorized
agents, the independent committees did not seem to have a problem
in planning appropriate strategies for using their funds. Because
of the wealth of information reported in the media and the use
of political consultants, the committees may have no need to co-
ordinate directly their activities. Kenneth Boehm, treasurer of the
Fund for a Conservative Majority, stated during the campaign that
members of his group scrupulously avoided contact with Reagan
campaign aides "to the point that we we avoid them at cocktail
parties." Nevertheless, he added that "we pretty much know what
the Reagan campaign strategy is from the newspapers." r" Fred
Wertheimer, Common Cause vice president, commented that "[t]he
law says Stu Spencer can't talk to anybody in the Reagan campaign.
But of course he doesn't have to; he knows what needs to be done
and how to get it done." 57 For the most part, the committees'
leaders made efforts to avoid contact with Reagan campaign offi-
cials.58 One exception was brought to light by a remark that Sen-
ator Jesse Helms made to Sander Vanocour of ABC News at the
time of the Republican National Convention. Asked whether he
had discussed with Governor Reagan the selection of a vice presi-
dential nominee, the Senator replied:
54 Campaign literature of Americans for Change (on file with the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review).
55 See Complaint at 18-21, Carter-Mondale Reelection Comm., Inc. v. Reagan
(certification granted by the FEC July 24, 1980), aff'd, No. 80-1842 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 12, 1980); Wash. Star, July 11, 1980, at A-4.
56 N.Y. Times, June 30, 1980, at B13, col. 1.
57 Wall St. J., June 19, 1980, at 20, col. 1.
58 N.Y. Times, June 23, 1980, at A21, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 30, 1980, at
B13, col. 1.
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Well, as you may know, we have had an independent effort
on in North Carolina. The law forbids me to consult with
him and it's been an awkward situation. I've had to, sort
of, talk indirectly with Paul Laxalt [Reagan's campaign
manager and Senator from Nevada] and hope that he
would pass along, uh, and I think the messages have gotten
through all right.59
Although the remark is not without ambiguity, it at least suggests
an attempt to circumvent the prohibition on consultation with the
candidate or his agents.
II. THE LITIGATED STATUTORY CHALLENGES TO THE
INDEPENDENT COMMITTEES
During the course of the 1980 campaign, the Common Cause
v. Schmitt 60 and FEC v. Americans for Change,1 suits were filed
seeking to halt, through declaratory and injunctive relief, the efforts
of the independent committees. With a different remedy in mind,
the Carter-Mondale Reelection Committee, Inc. v. Reagan 62 com-
plaint was brought before the FEC to have the committees' expendi-
tures treated as private funding that had been accepted by Reagan,
thereby precluding Reagan from receiving public funding. Al-
though Carter-Mondale was motivated primarily by partisanship, 3
Common Cause's opposition stemmed from its belief that, as stated
by its chairman, Archibald Cox, the independent efforts would "sub-
vert the scheme enacted by Congress for the federal funding of
Presidential elections." 1 Before assessing the merits of the claims
59 July 23, 1980, Supplement to Complaint at 1, Carter-Mondale Reelection
Comm., Inc. v. Reagan (certification granted by the FEC July 24, 1980), aff'd,
No. 80-1842 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 12, 1980).
60 No. 80-1609 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1980), prob. juris. noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3616
(U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-847).
,l No. 80-1754 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1980), prob. juris. noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3616
(U.S. Feb. 24, 1981) (No. 80-1067).
62Certification granted by the FEC July 24, 1980, aff'd, No. 80-1842 (D.C.
Cir. Sept. 12, 1980).
63 The lawusit is fast becoming an important weapon in the campaign manager's
arsenal. See Ifshin & Warn, supra note 45, at 58.
64 N.Y. Times, July 2, 1980, at Al7, col. 5.
Common Cause has a history of involvement in the enforcement and legislation
of federal election laws, dating back at least to 1971, when it brought suit against
the Democratic National Committee to seek enforcement of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act. See Common Cause v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803
(D.D.C. 1971). Common Cause was also one of the most significant forces behind
the FECA Amendments of 1974. See Fleishman & Greenwald, Public Interest
Litigation and Political Finance Reform, 425 ANrNALs 114 (May 1976).
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presented in these cases, it will be helpful to provide at this point
a brief overview of some of the major provisions of the election
statutes.6 5
A. The Federal Election Laws
The federal election laws, including the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act and Subtitle H of the Revenue Act of 1971 (collectively
referred to as the Act or the FECA) 6 provide a comprehensive
system for regulating the elections to all federal offices and for pub-
licly financing presidential elections. The scheme features contri-
bution limitations and disclosure requirements; a matching grant
system for candidates in primary presidential elections and full,
conditional funding of general presidential elections, and provisions
for administration and enforcement by an independent Federal
Election Commission.
1. Contribution Limitations
The Act places a limit of $1,000 on contributions by any per-
son to a candidate or his authorized committees in any calendar
year.8 7 It places a limit of $5,000 on contributions by persons to
other political committees in the same period.68 Multicandidate
political committees may make contributions of up to $5,000 to a
candidate or his authorized committees, or to other political com-
mittees. 9 Each of these contribution limitations applies separately
with respect to each election held in a calendar year, with the ex-
ception that all presidential primaries are considered to be one
election.70 There is no limit on the aggregate amount a multi-
candidate committee can contribute in a given year: such a com-
mittee can give up to $5,000 to an unlimited number of candidates
for various offices. Within a calendar year, however, an individual
may not make contributions aggregating more than $25,000.71 Ad-
6 5 For a discussion of the development of the federal election laws between
FECA 1971, FECA 1974, and FECA 1976, see Note, Current Status of the Federal
Election Campaign Act: Bucldey v. Valeo and the Legislative Response, 45 U. Cm.
L. REv. 623 (1976).
66 See notes 2 & 14 supra.
67 2 U.S.C. §441a(a)(1)(A) (1976).
68Id § 441a(a)(1)(C).
639 Id. § 441a(a) (2).
701d. § 441a(a)(6).
72ld. § 441a(a)(3).
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ditional limitations apply to contributions by banks, corporations
and labor unions.72
2. Reporting and Disclosure Requirements
The Act sets forth a number of registration and record-keeping
requirements for all political committees. For the purposes of the
reporting and disclosure requirements, a political committee is de-
fined as "any committee, club, association or other group of persons
which receives contributions . . . or which makes expenditures
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year." 73 A poli-
tical committee must file a statement-of-organization form with the
FEC within ten days after its organization, or after it anticipates
raising or spending $1,000.7 Committee treasurers are responsible
for keeping records of all contributions received and expenditures
made by the committee. 75 Each contribution of more than fifty
dollars must be identified by the name and address of the donor,
the date it was received, and the amount.76 All transfers of funds
by the committee must be identified, regardless of amount, by the
date, amount, recipient, and name and address of each candidate on
whose behalf the expenditure was made.
7 7
Each registered committee is required to file periodic reports
with the FEC until the committee has terminated its operations.
7 8
The reports must disclose the amount of cash on hand; the total
amount of receipts for the reporting period and the calendar year,
including contributions, transfers, loans, refunds, and dividends; the
name of each political committee that made a contribution or trans-
fer to the reporting committee, and the name of each person whose
aggregate contributions exceeded $200 during the calendar year.
Similar disclosures must be made regarding all expenditures by the
reporting committee. 79  In addition, every person (other than a
72 Id. § 441b. These provisions are considered in more detail at notes 194-203
infra & accompanying text
782 U.S.C. §431(4)(A) (Supp. I1 1979). The Fund Act defines political
committees more broadly: "any committee, association, or organization ...which
accepts contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing or at-
tempting to influence, the nomination or election of one or more individuals to
Federal, State, or local elective public office." .LC. § 9002(9).
'1 U.S.C. §433(a) (Supp. HI 1979).
75 Id. § 432(c).
761d. §432(c)(2).
771d. §432(c)(5).
78 Id. § 434(a).
79 d. § 434(b).
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political committee) who makes independent expenditures aggregat-
ing over $250 in a calendar year must file an individual statement.80
3. Public Funding of Presidential Election Campaigns
Subtitle H of the Revenue Act of 1971 1 provides for the public
subsidization of presidential primary and general elections. The
Act establishes within the United States Treasury a "Presidential
Election Campaign Fund" 8 that is financed by a tax checkoff sys-
tem. An individual may designate that one dollar of his tax
payment be used in the fund.a The fund is the source of all pub-
lic payments to eligible presidential candidates. In the primaries,
a grant system allocates to each eligible candidate up to five million
dollars (inflation-adjusted) in payments that match the contributions
that the candidate has received not exceeding $250 per person.8
In order to be eligible, a candidate must seek a party nomination,
agree to observe the Act's spending limits, and collect more than
$5,000 in contributions not exceeding $250 individually from resi-
dents of each of at least twenty states. 5 For the general election,
full subsidization-twenty million in 1974 dollars, as adjusted for
inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index-is provided for
major party candidates who opt for public funding; s6 minor and
new party candidates are given separate entitlements.8 7
A candidate must agree to several conditions in order to qual-
ify for public funding. First, he must agree not to make expendi-
tures in excess of $50,000 from personal or family funds.8 In the
primaries, an eligible candidate must agree to limit expenditures to
$10 million; 89 in the general election campaign, expenditures are
limited to the amount provided by public funding.90 In addition,
candidates accepting public funding must agree to be audited and
examined by the Commission.91
801d. §434(c)(1).
81 I.R.C. §§ 9001-9042.
82 Id. § 9006(a).
83 Id. § 6096(a). Married taxpayers who file jointly may designate that two
dollars be paid to the fimd.
84 Id. §9034; 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)-(c) (1976).
85 1.C. § 9033(b).
86 Id. § 9004(a) (1); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)-(c) (1976).
87I.R.C. §§ 9004(a)(2)-(3), 9004(d).
881d. §9004(d).
89 Id. § 9035(a); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b) (1976).
90 .LC. §§ 9003(b)(1), 9004(a)(1). See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b) (1976).
91I.R.C. §§9003(a)(3), 9033(a)(3).
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4. Coordinated Expenditures
The benefit to a candidate of the independent expenditure
"loophole" is that independent expenditures in support of his can-
didacy do not count against its contribution or expenditure limits,
and those independent expenditures are unlimited. The cost to a
candidate of having a supportive, non-authorized committee classi-
fied by the FEC as not truly independent is that all expenditures
by that committee will be treated as contributions in kind to and
expenditures by the candidate and his authorized committee.
92
This may place a given candidate and his authorized committee
above their legal expenditure limit, thereby exposing them to pos-
sible criminal penalties for exceeding the limit 93 and for filing
false statements with the FEC.94
5. The Federal Election Commission
The FECA is administered by an independent Federal Elec-
tion Commission. The Commission, composed of eight members,95
a general counsel, and additional staff,96 has exclusive jurisdiction
over the civil enforcement of the Act.97 It has poweri to conduct
investigations and hearings, render advisory opinions, initiate civil
actions for injunctive, declaratory, or other relief, and make regu-
lations pursuant to the Act.98 Criminal prosecutions are handled
by the Justice Department. 99
B. Section 9012(f) of the Fund Act
1. Plaintiffs' Arguments
In both Common Cause and Americans For Change, the plain-
tiffs argued that section 9012(f) of the Fund Act,1°° which had not
been discussed in Buckley v. Valeo, 0 1 prevented the defendant com-
9211 C.F.R. § 109.1(c) (1980). Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1976),
upheld the constitutionality of this procedure.
93 I.R.C. §§ 9012(a), 9042(a).
94 Id. §§9012(d), 9042(c). For the range of penalties that the FEC may
impose, see notes 160-63 infra & accompanying text.
9592 U.S.C. § 437c(a) (Supp. HI 1979).
96 Id. § 437c(f).
97 § 437c(b) (1).
98Id. § 437d(a).
99 See id. §§ 437d(a)(9), 437g(c)-(d).
100 I.R.C. § 9012(f) (originally enacted in Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-178, § 801, 85 Stat. 562).
1o1424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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mittees from making independent expenditures of more than $1,000
to promote a candidate's campaign. Their most obvious argument
was based on the "plain language" 102 of the provision. Section
9012(f)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that
it shall be unlawful for any political committee which is not
an authorized committee with respect to the eligible candi-
dates of a political party for President and Vice President
in a presidential election knowingly and willfully to incur
expenditures to further the election of such candidates,
which would constitute qualified campaign expenses if in-
curred by an authorized committee of such candidates, in
an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000.103
As the district court held, then, the section prohibits "all expendi-
tures over $1,000 by political committees including 'independent
expenditures.' "104
The plaintiffs also argued that the policies of the Act supported
their interpretation of section 9012(f. They claimed that the pro-
vision promoted the federal election laws' primary purpose, indenti-
fled in Buckley as the limitation of
the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from
large individual financial contributions . . . . To the
extent that large contributions are given to secure a poli-
tical quid pro quo from current and potential office
holders, the integrity of our system of representative de-
mocracy is undermined ....
Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid
pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of
corruption stemming from public awareness of the oppor-
tunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual
financial contributions. 1 5
This view of the Act's policies was echoed recently in Republican
National Committee v. FEC,10  in which the court noted that one
102 Common Cause, slip op. at 4.
103 I.R.C. § 9012(f)(1).
104 Common Cause, slip op. at 4 (emphasis in original).
105 424 U.S. at 26, 27.
Regardless of the extent to which § 9012(f) promotes the legislative purpose,
the provision remains something of a mystery. The legislative history on the pro-
vision is sparse, highlighted only by a comment that the conference agreement
eliminated the application of criminal penalties to "individuals" in addition to
"political committees." H.R. CONF. RP,. No. 708, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 58, re-
printed in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2053, 2078. Common Cause was
the first action brought under § 9012(f) in its nine years of existence.
106487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 1639 (1980).
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of the chief goals of the public financing scheme is the elimination
of "'reliance on large private contributions' and on the implicit
obligations to private contributors that may arise from such reli-
ance." 107
In a defensive posture, Common Cause found it necessary to
argue the constitutionality of section 9012 (f). It contended that,
unlike the provision struck down in Buckley, which had applied
to all individuals, groups, committees, and associations, section
9012(f) was not unconstitutional: it was tailored narrowly in order
to encompass only political committees, and it served a compelling
governmental interest-the prevention of the corrupting "implicit
obligations" created by large contributions. Common Cause argued
that Congress intended section 9012(f) to apply only to "centrally
managed organizations . . that solicit money from strangers, ag-
gregate it and decide how to spend it." These groups pose greater
dangers of corruption, the plaintiff contended, than do "informal
groups of persons." 108
2. The District Court's Holding
The three-judge district court 0 9 unanimously rejected the
plaintiffs' 110 claims under section 9012(f), holding that although
the section does apply to the defendant committees, it violates the
first amendment. The court's opinion, though inadequate in some
respects,"'' is essentially sound. Its significance lies in the way that
it applies Buckley to give to independent political committees first
amendment protection against narrowly drawn spending limitations.
a. A Review of the Buckley Decision
In reaching its holding, the district court began with a review
of the first amendment analysis relied upon in Buckley. There,
the Supreme Court had ruled that, because the FECA's contribution
and expenditure limitations operate in the area of political ex-
107 id. 284 (quoting S. RE. No. 689, supra note 11, reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws 5587, 5591-92).
108 Plaintiffs' Opening Brief on the Merits at 40, 41, Common Cause, No. 80-
1609 (D.D.C. Sept 30, 1980), prob. furis. noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3616 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1981) (No. 80-847).
109 The three-judge district court was convened pursuant to I.R.C. § 9011(b),
mandating that suits to implement the Fund Act shall be heard by a three-judge
panel "at the earliest practicable date," with appeals going directly to the Supreme
Court. Id.
11o Common Cause and Americans for Change were consolidated for decision.
111 See text accompanying notes 134-49 infra.
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pression-the area of expression accorded the broadest first amend-
ment protection-a strict scrutiny test must be used.11 2 The Court
then proceeded to distinguish between contributions and expendi-
tures, and concluded that the Act's expenditure ceilings "impose
significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of po-
litical expression and association than do its limitations on financial
contributions." 113 The Court reasoned:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or
group can spend on political communication during a.cam-
paign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of
their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.
This is because virtually every means of communicating
ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of
money ....
By contrast .... a limitation upon the amount that
any one person or group may contribute to a candidate
or political committee entails only a marginal restriction
upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communi-
cation. A contribution serves as a general expression of
support for the candidate and his views, but does not com-
municate the underlying basis for the support." 4
In effect, the Court was distinguishing between direct and indirect
interests in speech," 5 a distinction it relied on again when analyzing
the Act's impingement of protected associational freedoms:
[T]he Act's contribution limitations permit associations
and candidates to aggregate large sums of money to pro-
mote effective advocacy. By contrast, the Act's $1,000
limitation on independent expenditures ... precludes most
associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their
adherents, the original basis for the recognition of First
Amendment protection of the freedom of association." 116
On the basis of these principles, the Buckley Court upheld
the Act's limitations on contributions " 7 because of the strong gov-
11 424 U.S. at 16.
113 Id. 23.
114 Id. 19-21 (footnote omitted).
115 See Polsby, supra note 7.
116 424 U.S. at 22.
117 Id. 29.
[VoL 129:955
INDEPENDENT POLITICAL COMMITTEES
ernmental interest in preventing the "actuality and appearance of
corruption," 118 but at the same time it found the governmental
interest not sufficiently threatened by independent expenditures to
justify the Act's ceiling in that area.119 Significantly, this conclusion
was based partly on the Court's observation that "the independent
advocacy restricted by the provision does not presently appear to
pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those
identified with large campaign contributions." 120
Another clearly identified congressional purpose behind the
expenditure limitations was the protection of the overall regulatory
scheme. That is, the expenditure limitations, the Senate Rules and
Administration Committee reported,1 1 were needed to prevent con-
tributors who had given up to their contribution limits from cir-
cumventing such limits by disguising further contributions in the
form of expenditures. The Supreme Court addressed this concern,
but found it, too, lacking. It noted that because any expenditures
coordinated with the candidate or his campaign would be treated
as contributions under the Act, the contribution ceilings will "pre-
vent attempts to circumvent the Act through prearranged or co-
ordinated expenditures amounting to disguised contributions." 122
Although this does not entirely address the problem, in that a sup-
porter could still aid a candidate by making uncoordinated ex-
penditures, the Court did theorize that the absence of coordination
between a candidate and a person making an expenditure in his
behalf tends to undermine the value of the expenditure to the
candidate and also "alleviates the danger that expenditures will be
given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candi-
date." 123
Finally, the Court considered the argument that a govern-
mental interest "in equalizing the relative ability of individuals
and groups to influence the outcome of elections" 24 justified the
expenditure limitation. This argument expressed the idea that the
regnlatory scheme, by placing relatively low limits on both con-
tributions and expenditures, served to minimize the disparity be-
tween large and small donors with respect to the potential effect
118 Id, 26.
119Id. 51. For the text of the independent expenditure provision that was
invalidated by Buckley, see note 3 supra.
120 424 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added).
121 See note 11 supra.
122 424 U.S. at 47. See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
123 424 U.S. at 47. See note 191 infra.
124 424 U.S. at 48.
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that their spending could have on the election. The Buckley
analysis, however, dismissed this consideration quickly, stating that
"the concept that government may restrict the speech of some ele-
ments of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment .... '" 125 According to
this view, Congress cannot attempt to ensure equal spending on
behalf of candidates if it involves infringing first amendment
rights.1
26
b. The District Court's Application of Buckley
Given the Supreme Court's strong language in Buckley, the
plaintiff, to maintain an action against an independent political
committee under section 9012(f), would have to demonstrate that
expenditures by this relatively new type of group 127 create greater
potential evils than do independent expenditures by individuals
or by other, less formally structured, groups. To that end, the
plaintiff in Common Cause proferred a definition of political com-
mittees that characterized them as centrally managed organizations
that solicit funds by mail.12 8 Although that definition finds no
support in the language or the legislative history of the statute, the
court was willing to accept the position that the term "political
committees" refers to formally organized collectives as opposed to
"informal groups." 129 Oddly, however, the court gave no further
consideration to the role of central management in the functioning
of these committees. The court seemed content to rely upon an
unrealistic image of the committees as "simply 'pooling agents' for
many small voices wishing to make intelligible political state-
ments." 130
The court rejected the argument that greater evils inhere in
independent political committees than in individuals or informal
independent groups: the committees could not be restricted simply
because they are more effective in promoting their views.131 Most
importantly, when addressing the specific evil that was focused on
125 Id. 48-49.
126 See note 223 infra & accompanying text.
127 See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
128 See text accompanying note 108 supra.
129 Common Cause, slip op. at 14. Without a limiting construction of "political
committees," § 9012 (f) might suffer from unconstitutional vagueness. Specificity is
required because "First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive."
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
130 Common Cause, slip op. at 13.
131 Id. 14.
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in Buckley, the court concluded that independent political com-
mittees do not engender corruption, and that therefore the govern-
mental interest in eliminating corruption is insufficient to sustain
the provision. The court stated that "[a]ny attempted exaction of
a quid pro quo by a political committee would of course totally
eliminate the constitutional protection reserved under Buckley for
expenditures that are independent." 132 Apart from such conduct,
however, the district court decided that independent expenditures
by political committees do not pose any greater problems of corrup-
tion than do the other types of independent expenditures found
constitutionally protected in Buckley. This conclusion was based
in large measure on the court's idea, noted above, of how the com-
mittees function. Without considering the status of the committee
leaders, the court -wrote that "[ilt is difficult . . . to imagine how
the thousands of 'small voices' associated together in a political
committee could compromise a candidate for President." 133
3. Criticism of the Court's Holding
The district court's opinion in Common Cause and Americans
for Change may be criticized on at least two counts. First, the
court failed to consider the governmental interest in preventing the
"appearance of corruption," which was discussed in Buckley in con-
junction with the interest in preventing corruption itself. Some
evidence exists, in the form of newspaper editorial responses to
"those 'independent' fat-cat spenders," 134 that the political commit-
tees do create an appearance of corruption. Even if this concern
could be satisfactorily substantiated, however, it is uncertain what
weight it should, standing by itself, be afforded.
Second, the court failed to provide a more probing examina-
tion of the political impact of large expenditures by centrally-
managed committees. This fault results from the court's failure to
adequately distinguish between the thousands of contributors to a
large committee and the organizers and managers of that commit-
tee. The court virtually equated the contributor's first amendment
rights with the communications drafted by the executive committee
of the group, because it perceived the organizers of a political com-
132 Id. 17.
13 Id.
134 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1980, at A26, col. 1 (editorial entitled "The
Fat Cats Revisited"); Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 1980, at A16, col. 1 (editorial entitled
"The Sham of it All").
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mittee as being merely "agents" 135 for contributors, "bound to
reify the political thoughts of their member-contributors," 136 and
"only mobiliz[ing] existing political sentiment looking for an out-
let ... ." 137 Contributors have effective power over the speech
disseminated by political committees, the court postulated, because
if "a committee disappoints its membership, contributions will dry
up. , 138
The court's analysis is based upon several unsupported and
unsupportable assumptions. At the outset, it seems to posit some
sort of ongoing interaction between the leaders and contributors of
a political committee. The currency of this interaction is the flow
of contributions, increasing and decreasing according to the satis-
faction level of contributors. This paradigm may be appropriate
when applied to mature, permanent, multicandidate committees
that solicit funds from a core group of patrons and extend their
operations beyond mass mailings. 139 The model is inappropriate,
however, when applied to many of the committees that sprung up
during the 1980 Presidential election.140  Many of these existed
solely for the purpose of backing one particular candidate in one
particular campaign; they did not exist before the campaign and
they disappeared after it was over. It is difficult, if not impossible,
to conceive of contributors effectively controlling the operations of
such organizations. Contributors are solicited at arms length
through personally-addressed, yet standardized form letters. The
money of a Delaware contributor may be used to buy radio time
in Texas. Indeed, the committee may solicit funds nationally but
spend them only in states in which the election is hotly contested
or which have a large number of electoral votes. Nothing about
this type of committee suggests that a contributor will have any
idea how his money is being spent. Moreover, even assuming that
a contributor could obtain that information, he would probably
not be able to change the course of expenditures if he so desired.
First, the influence of an individual contributor is limited by the
135 Common Cause, slip op. at 14.
lS6 Id. 16.
137 Id. 21.
'8s Id. 14.
139 Such activities might include, for example, grassroots organizing similar to
that of a political party. Such an organizing effort was attempted by Americans for
Change. See campaign literature of Americans for Change (on file with the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review). The result of this effort is unknown.
140 Note that permanent, multicandidate committees may undertake a "project"
on behalf of a particular candidate that, to an average small contributor, is indis-
tinguishable from a temporary, one-candidate committee. For a description of the
major 1980 committees, see text accompanying notes 36-55 supra.
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FECA $5,000 limit on individual contributions to a political com-
mittee.141  Most contributors probably do not give up to that
limit,14 2 and the amount is small both relatively (compared to the
hundreds of thousands of dollars spent by a major committee) and
absolutely (in light of the cost of a single television commercial in
a large media market). Second, if an individual does contribute up
to his legal or personal limit, he loses any influence he may have
once derived from his control over further contributions. Because
there is nothing left to "dry up," he has lost his weapon to demon-
strate displeasure with the conduct of the committee.
Perhaps the most serious consequence of the court's analysis
for the federal election laws, therefore, is its failure to take into
account the potentially significant amount of influence that com-
mittee managers might have on the election process. By reasoning
that any potential for actual or apparent corruption by independent
political committees was sufficiently disposed of by the limitation
on individual contributions to the committees, 43 the court com-
pletely ignored the ramifications of their hierarchical, centralized
structures. Treating political committees as horizontal, albeit for-
malized, organizations is justified only if the managers of these
committees are merely agents for their contributors. As has been
seen, however, that approach is unrealistic; at best, it is a fiction.
The court's opinion would have been more accurate had it
recognized the independent committees as organizations created by
political entrepreneurs who, through means of technologically-
advanced fundraising, collect small amounts of money from many
people, aggregate those sums into huge funds, centralize control
over the expenditure of these funds in small groups of managers,
and concentrate their efforts on electing one or a few selected candi-
dates. If this characterization of political committees is accepted,
the case for finding a strong congressional interest that validates the
regulation of these groups becomes more forceful, assuming that the
final step, as mandated by Buckley, can be taken: a demonstration
of the existence of real or apparent corruption stemming from their
unfettered expenditures. In the context of corporate expenditures
for a particular candidate, the Supreme Court has suggested that,
if the current prohibition144 is challenged, such a showing could
1412 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1) (A) (1976).
142 Unfortunately, this estimate will not be verifiable until the FEC releases its
final report covering independent committees, and that will not take place until
after this Comment has gone to press.
143 Common Cause, slip op. at 18-19.
144 See note 194 infra & accompanying text.
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possibly be made.145 If that were the case with regard to independ-
ent committees, the first amendment interest in allowing uncon-
trolled expenditures could conceivably be overridden, and the
limitations justified. 14
In theory, at least, the basis for this demonstration already
exists. It is widely agreed in the scholarly literature on campaign
finance that one of the effects of large contributions in election
campaigns is to provide the contributor with access to the candidate
after he is elected. Even if the contributor does not "buy" a com-
mitment on a specific issue, a sympathetic hearing from the elected
official is generally assured. 147 It seems reasonable to assume that
an independent committee organizer who raises and spends hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars on behalf of a candidate might get
the same treatment as a large contributor. 148 In the case of the
pro-Reagan committees, this is a factual question presently without
an answer. In the case of independent committees generally, as
Fred Wertheimer of Common Cause has remarked, "there is no
track record .... It hasn't been done this way before, so there is
nothing to point to now and say 'This is corrupting.' -149
C. Challenges to the Independence of the Committees
If the statutory limits on independent committees' expenditures
are constitutionally invalid, the committees' expenditures can be
constrained by law only if it is proved that they are not truly inde-
pendent. Challengers to these committees must show that, as a
factual matter, the challenged committees are "coordinated" with
a candidate or candidates. Once this is done, the committees' ex-
penditures will be limited because the Act treats coordinated
expenditures as contributions,150 and under Buckley contribution
limitations are permissible.151
145 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978).
146 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
147 See, e.g., D. DuNN, FINNciNG FtsmsAmx CAMPAINs 20-22 (1972)
(citing D. TRUMAN, THE GovmmmENTAL PaocEss 264 (1951); A. HEARD, THE
CosTs OF DEmocRAcY 88-89 (1960).
148 This seems especially likely for those committees that are headed by long-
time political professionals. See notes 54 & 55 supra & accompanying text. There
are factors, however, that detract from the amount of influence that committee man-
agers may be able to wield after an election, and these may be quite significant in
some elections. See notes 191 & 192 infra & accompanying text.
149 Wall St. J., June 19, 1980, at 20, col. 5.
150 See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
151 See text accompanying notes 112-18 supra.
[Vol. 129:955
INDEPENDENT POLITICAL COMMITTEES
1. The FEC's Exclusive Jurisdiction
Congress has provided the FEC with "exclusive jurisdiction
with respect to the civil enforcement" of the FECA.152 As a result,
a private party seeking enforcement of the Act must first file a com-
plaint with the FEC.15 3 If the Commission determines that it has
reason to believe a violation of the Act has been or is about to be
committed, it must conduct an investigation of the alleged vio-
lation.154
When the FEC undertakes an investigation into allegedly co-
ordinated committee expenditures, it applies several tests, of vary-
ing degrees of difficulty, to evaluate the merits of the charge. It
considers an expenditure not independent when the expenditure is
"made with the cooperation or with the prior consent of, or in
consultation with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate
or any agent or authorized committee of such candidate." '51 These
circumstances have legal significance only if they occurred "prior
to the publication, distribution, display, or broadcast of the com-
munication." 156 Where an expenditure has been made on behalf
of a candidate by a current or former officer or employee of the
candidate's committee, there is a presumption that it is not inde-
pendent 57 Such a presumption also arises if the expenditure was
based on information about the candidate's campaign that was pro-
vided by the candidate or his agents "with a view toward having
an expenditure made." 15 Finally, any expenditure to disseminate
or republish a broadcast or other written campaign materials pre-
pared by a candidate or his agents is considered, for purposes of the
independent committee's limitations, a contribution to the candi-
date, but is not considered an expenditure by the candidate unless
it would otherwise qualify as a coordinated expenditure. 15 9
In conjunction with the limitations on coordinated expendi-
tures, the Act provides substantial penalties for violations. Al-
though "conciliation agreements" are preferred, 10 the Commission
may institute an action in district court to impose civil penalties
1522 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1979).
153 Carter-Mondale, slip op. at 8; Common Cause, slip op. at 26; In re Federal
Election Campaign Act Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (D.D.C. 1979).
1542 U.S.C. §437g(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
'55 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(a) (1980).
156 Id. § 109.1 (b) (4) (i).
157 Id. § 109.1(b) (4) (i) (B).
158 Id. § 109.1 (b) (4) (i) (A).
159 id, § 109.1 (d) (1).
160 See note 165 infra & accompanying text.
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of up to the greater of $5,000 or the amount of the contribution or
expenditure involved.'," If the Commission finds that a knowing
and willful violation has been committed, it may seek a penalty of
the greater of two times the above amounts. 6 2 Additionally, any
person who knowingly and willfully commits a violation involving
a sum of over $2,000 may be subject to one year's imprisonment
and a fine of the greater of $25,000 or three times the amount
involved in the violation.6 3
The Act requires that the FEC conduct its investigations "ex-
peditiously." -14 At the same time, however, it requires the Com-
mission to encourage voluntary compliance by seeking "conciliation
agreements" with alleged violators, 15 a process that may not lead
to the speediest enforcement of the Act. 166 The Act contains a
schedule according to which the FEC must act upon the complaints
filed with it. Where the Commission determines that there is prob-
able cause to believe that a violation has occurred or is about to
occur, it must try, for at least thirty days, to resolve the matter
through informal methods of conciliation."" These attempts are
supposed to continue for not more than ninety days.
1 8
After waiting 120 days for the FEC to act, the party questioning
the independence of a committee may seek judicial review of the
agency's failure to act.169 Thus, "until an investigation is com-
pleted, and the FEC has issued an order, or the statutory time limit
for action has expired, the FEC is allowed to conduct its investi-
gation . . . without judicial interference." 170 After that period,
the courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review the FEC's action
or inaction on the complaint. The standard of judicial review at
this point is whether the agency has acted arbitrarily, capriciously,
or contrary to law.
1
7
1
1612 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(6) (A) (Supp. 1111979).
162 Id. §437g(a)(6)(C).
1631Id. § 437g(d) ( 1) (A).
164Id. § 437d(a) (9).
165 Id. § 437g(a) (4) (A).
166 See notes 172-85 infra & accompanying text.
1672 U.S.C. §437g(a)(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 1111979).
168 Id. The mandatory conciliation period is reduced to a minimum of 15 days
if the Commission's probable cause determination occurs during the 45-day period
immediately preceding an election. Id. § 437g(4)(A) (ii).
169Id. §437g(a)(8)(A). The party must file his complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. Note, however, that if the
party is challenging an FEC certification or determination, as was the case in
Carter-Mondale, judicial review takes place in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. I.R.C. § 9011(a).
170 Carter-Mondale, slip op. at 11.
171Id. 9; Common Cause v. FEC, 489 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D.D.C. 1980).
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2. The Slow Pace of Enforcement
In practice, the operation of the scheme outlined above renders
truly expeditious enforcement unlikely. By requiring an exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies before court action can be insti-
tuted,172 the complainant is subjected to what some see as an overly
slow pace of FEC enforcement. One study in late 1977 found the
following:
Of more than 480 complaints submitted to the commission
since 1975, all but 54 remained unresolved in November
1977 or had been settled during preliminary stages of in-
vestigation. . . . Despite the statutory requirement that
the commission act on all complaints within 90 days, a
review of 100 complaints received by the agency between
July and mid-October 1976 indicated that only 51 had
been so handled-and 22 cases remained open one year
later. 7
3
The courts have not discouraged this slow pace. For example,
in an earlier case, Common Cause v. FEC,174 the Commission took
about three years to find probable cause, and well over ninety days
to conclude conciliation agreements with the target political action
committees. 7 While the court was "disturbed" by the elapsed
length of time,176 it approved the extension the FEG was request-
ing because by the time of its decision the FEC was anticipating
that the remaining committees would quickly enter into concilia-
tion agreements. 77
The Carter-Mondale Committee had its complaint on file with
the FEC since July 2, 1980; 178 Common Cause has had its on file
since September 26.179 Yet, despite the significance of these matters
172 See, e.g., Carter-Mondale, slip op. at 8; Common Cause, slip op. at 25, 26.
173 H. ALmXANE, supra note 21, at 139-40. Because these statistics fail to
account for the number of cases closed after preliminary review, they may overstate
the sluggishness of FEC enforcement Whatever inaccuracy this may cause, it is
probably minimal. In its Annual Report for 1979, the FEC reported that its
enforcement caseload had been twice as large as in 1977, the most recent nonelection
year. In addition, "in 1979, the majority of all cases proceeded beyond preliminary
review and required investigation, reversing the trend of previous years." [1979]
FED. ELEcrroN Comm. ANN. REP. 22 (footnote omitted). The increasingly complex
legal and factual issues found in these cases frequently require longer initial investi-
gative periods. Id.
174 489 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1980).
175 Id. 742-45.
176 Id. 744.
177 Id.
178 Carter-Mondale, slip op. at 2.
179 Telephone interview with Ellen Block, attorney for Common Cause.
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for the 1980 campaign, they were not resolved by election day.
Should the FEC now determine that the committees were coordi-
nated with the candidate, the result would be insignificant. Al-
though the candidate or his committee may have to repay to the
Treasury the amount expended by the "independent" commit-
tees, 80 or pay a fine,' 8' the outcome of the election has already
been determined. At least for the victor of a presidential election,
the cost of a violation may be meaningless. 18 2
The operation of the statutory scheme thus appears somewhat
ineffective, but the delays may be unavoidable. The time required
to make factual investigations into "independence" simply might
not be reducible to a more acceptable level, in part because the
Commission is not always given the cooperation of the respondents
to administrative complaints, who can purposefully delay investiga-
tive efforts.'83 Ideally, the FEC could be required to give expedited
attention to charges challenging a committee's true independ-
ence. 84 In an election context, however, where any number of
other types of violations might also merit speedy treatment, it is
not clear that this would be appropriate. Finally, providing private
access to the courts for purposes of seeking injunctive relief would
not be feasible. As the district court stated in Common Cause v.
Schmitt:
It would be incongruous and cumbersome for a three-
judge court, ordered by Congress to expedite its considera-
tion, to supervise extensive discovery and receive detailed
factual evidence .... [A]n expedited judgment on com-
pliance is not appropriate to a non-expert three-judge
court evaluating in the first instance circumstances sur-
rounding an election controversy. 8 5
18026 U.S.C. § 9007(b) (1976).
1811d. § 9012(a). A fine will be imposed only if the violation was knowing
and willful. Id.
182 Of course, no suggestion is made here that either a court or the FEC should
be empowered to undo an election on these grounds.
183 See, e.g., Common Cause v. FEC, 489 F. Supp. at 744: the court found
that the "American Medical Association and other respondents in the administrative
proceeding dragged their feet at every conceivable opportunity, requiring for exam-
pIe, on numerous occasions judicial intervention and enforcement of Commission
subpoenas, otherwise regular and proper."
184Cf. National Labor Relations Act, § 10(1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1976)
(certain types of unfair labor practice complaints given priority over other types of
cases).
185 Common Cause v. Schmitt, slip op. at 23-24. Cf. Leventhal, Courts and
Political Thickets, 77 CoLum. L. RFrv. 345, 386-87 (1977) (congressional mandate
that a court should expedite its considerations should not be construed "as requiring
the court to rush to decision before it is ready").
[Vol. 129:955
INDEPENDENT POLITICAL COMMITTEES
III. THE OUTLOOK FOR FUTURE ELECTIONS
A. The Independent Committees
Because the recent cases brought under the federal election
laws have served to accentuate those laws' inadequacies, at least with
regard to independent political committees, the result may be to
encourage even further the proliferation of such organizations.
When the Buckley v. Valeo "I" decision was handed down in 1976, it
was predicted in congressional hearings that the committees would
become increasingly important. 187  Similarly, Professor David
Adamany made a well-founded prediction that "the $1,000 indi-
vidual limit [on contributions to candidates], while reducing the
influence of big givers, probably increases the importance of well-
connected solicitors, of ideological money, and of mass mail spe-
cialists." 188 Campaign finance expert Professor Herbert Alexander
reported in 1979 that "political fund-raising patterns are changing.
To the extent that the wealthy donor is now limited, focus is shift-
ing to fund-raisers who can organize and solicit interest groups." 189
Thus, the trend toward more potent independent committee ac-
tivity, which began in the aftermath of the Buckley decision, may
accelerate in the 1984 campaign in light of the 1980 experience
with the enforcement of the relevant FECA provisions. It is likely
that the 1984 campaign will see a spate of challenges to independent
committees; however, it is also likely that, even if valid, these chal-
lenges will bear no fruit during the campaign. Unless Congress
once again rewrites the election laws, its policy of limiting the role
of private money in determining elections may be thwarted.
Beyond that prediction, however, little can be said about the
effect that independent committees' expenditures have had or will
have on the integrity of our political processes and election laws.
188424 U.S. 1 (1976).
1st At the hearings before the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the
Senate Rules and Administration Committee, George Agree, Director of the Com-
mittee for Democratic Process, commented on the invalidation of the independent
expenditure limitations: 'Every precedent in the history of campaign finance regu-
lation supports the expectation that unchecked streams of money will flow again,
albeit somewhat indirectly through the independent committees." Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Privi-
leges and Elections of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 173, 175 (1976) (statement of George Agree), reprinted in FEDomLr.
ErecTiON CommissioN, supra note 15, at 179, 181.
188 Adamany, The Sources of Money: An Overview, 425 ANNALs 17, 30 (May
1976).
189 H. AL. ANnn, supra note 21, at 661.
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Political analysts disagree on the question.lw° There is some specu-
lation that the efforts of some of these groups may have hindered
more than helped the candidates they supported.191 Many conserva-
tive committee leaders are already claiming that they have been
forgotten by the Reagan administration that they helped to elect.192
Concerns about disparities in spending also may diminish if, as
suspected, those on the other end of the political spectrum from
the majority of the existing committees form their own well-financed
groups.
The issue of independent expenditures cannot be addressed
in isolation from the other issues confronting the electoral process.
The independent committees may be a vehicle for involving in the
political process previously disenchanted and ignored voters. 193
Stifling these groups may then achieve only undesirable "reform" at
the cost of enhancing the influence of established corporate and
labor groups.
B. Corporate and Labor Committees
Corporation and labor union political action committees
(PACs) pose a problem similar to that created by the growth of
190 Compare Alexander, Election Reform: A Mixed Blessing?, CAmPAIGNS &
ELECTIONS 8 (Fall 1980) with Cohen, PAC Power: Why Common Cause Fears Its
Impact, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS 13 (Summer 1980).
191 See, e.g., 'Independent" Groups Aim to Give Reagan Edge, N.Y. Times,
June 23, 1980, at A21, col. 3; It's In, But How Powerful is the New Right?, Phila.
Inquirer, Nov. 11, 1980, at Al, col. 3; Wall St. J., June 19, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
A perceived problem with many of the independent efforts was that they ran a
negative campaign, sharply attacking President Carter and his associates, while the
official Reagan organization tried to run a generally positive campaign. The Su-
preme Court, in Buckley, pointed to the lack of "prearrangement and coordination"
generally in predicting that independent expenditures would be of little value to
the candidate, and would possibly be counterproductive. 424 U.S. at 47.
192 See, e.g., Phila. Inquirer, Nov. 15, 1980, at Al, col. 3. Cf. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 18, 1981, at A18, col 1 (comments of G.O.P. Chairman Richard Richards);
N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1980, at B1O, col. 1 (comments of Vice President Bush).
If so, this would appear to lend credence to another of the Supreme Court's con-
tentions in Buckley: the absence of prearrangement of expenditures with a candidate
minimizes the danger that the candidate will make improper commitments to
committee organizers, 424 U.S. at 47.
193 Prior to the enactment of the FECA, most campaign financing came from
a relatively small group of wealthy people who traditionally gave money for politics.
See Adamany, supra note 188. With the advent of individual contribution limita-
tions, most candidates have had to reach greater numbers of people in order to
raise the requisite funds. In great part, their efforts have been made possible by
technological innovations such as complex office machinery and computer-generated
direct mass mailings. Professional political consultants have played a key role in
this revolution. See generally Nzw STYLE iN ELEcTIoN CA I'AICNS (R. Agranoff
ed. 1976); H. AXANDmE, F NcNG Forrcs: MONEY, ELECToNs & PoLrIcJAL
REFoEm 32-34 (1976). This technological and professional revolution is the basis
of the independent political finance committee. See notes 46-49 & 53-55 supra &
accompanying text.
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independent political committees. As a general rule, it is unlawful
for any national bank, corporation, or labor union to make either
contributions or expenditures on behalf of any candidate in a fed-
eral election.194 This proscription, however, can be avoided by
establishing a "separate segregated fund," 195 or PAC. Although the
corporation or union cannot directly contribute money to or make
expenditures for a candidate, it may finance the operation of a
PAG that solicits contributions from its employees or members. 196
The growth in the number of PACs, especially corporate PACs,
has been extraordinary. In December 1974 there were only 89
19 4 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979). There are certain exceptions
to this rule. First, a corporation is permitted unlimited partisan communications to
its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their families, and a
labor union is permitted unlimited partisan communications to its members and
their families. Second, unlimited non-partisan activities-such as registration and
get-out-the-vote campaigns-by a corporation are permitted when aimed at its
stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their families, and by a
labor union when aimed at its members and their families. Id. § 441b(a)(2). For
labor unions, at least, these exceptions can be very significant: in some cases the
numbers of voters involved "might add up to as much as half of a state's or a
district's voting population." H. A=xnza, supra note 21, at 624 (footnote
omitted).
1952 U.S.C. §441b(b)(4)(c) (1976).
196 Id. See FEDERAL ELECTION COmmisSION, CAMPAIGN GUIDE FOR PoLrTcAL
CoisdrrrEs, reprinted in [1978] Fed. Elec. Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH) f9063.
The corporation or labor union may use its funds to cover, without limitation, the
costs of office space, phones, salaries, utilities, supplies, and other expenses incurred
in the operation of and fundraising for a PAC. 11 C.F.R. § 114.1(b) (1980).
PACs may contribute to candidates in the same manner as other political committees,
and are subject to the same contribution limitations as are political committees
generally. Id. § 114.5(f).
Corporations, labor unions, and their PACs are subject to special solicitation
restrictions. Generally, a corporation or its PAC is permitted to solicit contributions
only from its stockholders, executive or administrative personnel, and their families,
while a labor union or its PAC may solicit contributions only from its members and
their families. Id. § 114.5(g) (1) & (2). Twice a year, however, a corporation
may make written solicitations to the remainder of its employees for contributions
to its PAC, and twice a year a labor union may make such solicitations to all the
non-union member employees and stockholders of the corporations in which it rep-
resents members working for the association. Id. § 114.6(a) & (b). In no case
may a corporation or labor union PAC secure funds by physical force, job discrimi-
nation, financial reprisals, or the threat thereof, or by dues or fees required as a
condition of employment or membership. Id. § 114.5(a).
For a discussion of the history of congressional regulation of corporate and
union campaign contributions and expenditures, see Mager, Past and Present At-
tempts by Congress And the Courts to Regulate Corporate and Union Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures in the Election of Federal Officials, 1976 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 338 (1976), reprinted in PaAcTism LAw INsTrruFE, TmE CoPxotAmorxoN
PoLrrcs 1978, at 675 (1978). The constitutionality of these restrictions has been
seriously and widely questioned as a result of Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and
First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See Birnbaum, The
Constitutionality of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act After First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 28 Am. U. L. REv. 149 (1979); Bolton, Constitutional Limita-
tions on Restricting Corporate and Union Political Speech, 22 ARIz. L. REv. 373
(1980); Note, Corporate Political Action Committees: Effect of the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 26 CATm U. L. RBv. 756 (1977).
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corporate PACs in existence; by October 1977 there were 508,197
and by December 1979 there were 949.19s By contrast, the growth
of labor union PACs appears to have stabilized. In October 1977
there were 222 of them; in December 1979 there were 240.-99 Over-
all, the total number of active registered PACs, as of December
1979, was 2000.200
Moreover, the influence of PACs seems to have increased in
relative as well as absolute terms. Professor Alexander has noted
that the limits placed on individual contributions "led to a rela-
tive increase in the importance of interest group donations. PACs
sponsored by special interest groups have become more important,
and the interest group component of campaign finance has in-
creased while proportionally the individual component has de-
creased." 201
The chief distinction between corporate and union PACs on
the one hand, and independent political committees on the other,
is that PACs are limited as to the types of people that they may
solicit for funds.20 2 As with political committees in general, there
are no restrictions on the amount of money a PAC may spend in
communications directed at the general public. 20 3 Under the FECA,
then, PACs potentially have as great an impact on elections and on
the integrity of the federal election law scheme as do independent
political committees. As a practical matter, PACs collectively have
an advantage, because they have easily identifiable groups from
which to solicit, and the money to cover the various expenses of a
PAC is readily available from its corporation or union. A given
independent committee, however, if organized with sufficient re-
sources to allow it to take advantage of the current techniques in
political fundraising, may be able to collect funds on a scale far
exceeding that of most PACs.
This Comment's proposal, which follows in the next section,
would probably have less of an effect on corporate and union PACs
197 See Boggs, PACs: Business' Political Renaissance, TejAL, Jan. 1978, at 5, 6.
198 Baran, Recent Developments in Federal Election Laws, in IAAcTIMsG LAw
INsrrrtuTE, TiE ConpoRAi&oN mN Pomrcs 1980, at 11.
199 Boggs, supra note 197, at 6.
200 Baron, supra note 198, at 11.
201 H. ALmLumE, supra note 21, at 555. See also Sorauf, Political Parties and
Political Action Committees, 22 Auz. L. Rnv. 445, 454-59 (1980).
2 02 See note 196 supra.
2 0 3 See id. See also Maloney, From Marketplace to Ballot Box: The Corporate
Assertion of Political Power, 12 CoNN. L. REv. 14, 46 (1977).
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than it would on independent committees. The proposal is de-
signed to siphon funds away from committees formed to aid specific
presidential candidates, and to direct those funds back to the candi-
dates themselves. Unlike an independent committee, however, a
PAC is not created in order to promote certain candidates, but
rather to promote primarily the interests of the corporation, bank,
or union from which it is formed.20 As a result, a contribution to
a corporate or union PAC may be at least partly motivated by a
desire to promote the corporation's or union's interests, not the
candidate's interests. Such contributions are less likely to be af-
fected by an opportunity to contribute to presidential candidates
directly during the general election. Any proposal that would
tend to decrease the impact of independent political committees
could therefore have the effect of increasing the relative impact of
corporate and union PACs. To keep the influences in balance,
then, some additional constraints should perhaps be placed on
PACs if Congress places new restrictions on the independent com-
mittees. Although a full consideration of this question is well
beyond the scope of this Comment, some suggestions are in order.
First, PACs should be limited in the aggregate amount of money
they may contribute to federal candidates in a calendar year. This
suggestion is also made below with respect to independent multi-
candidate committees.20 Second, a limitation should be placed on
the amount that a corporation or union can contribute to the ex-
penses of the PAC or PACs that it establishes. This would diminish
the advantage that these PAGs already have relative to other politi-
cal committees because of their ability to draw upon general corpo-
rate or union funds to pay for their expenses.
2 04 See generally H. Ar.xANomi, supra note 21, at 561. The different purpose
of the PACs, as opposed to the independent committees, is exhibited in the way
that the PACs spend their money. In the 1976 election, corporate PACs contributed
to incumbent congressmen over their challengers by a ratio of 4:1. Id. 545. Be-
cause incumbents have historically stood a greater chance of winning, this at least
suggests that PACs are more interested in backing winners than in backing candi-
dates with specific ideologies. n some cases, PACs give to opposing candidates in
the same race, something that would be quite unexpected if done by an independent
committee. Professor Alexander cites one case study in which a Southern Bell
Telephone PAC gave money to each of the two Democratic and two Republican
contenders in the 1972 North Carolina gubernatorial race. Id. 576.
205 See text following note 208 infra.
A similar proposal was made in the Congress with respect to contribution limits
for House of Representative races. See the Campaign Contribution Reform Act of
1979 (popularly known as the "Obey-Railsback bill"), H.R. 4970, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 125 Co N. REc. 8111, 9261 (1979). It was passed in the House on October
17, 1979, but was defeated in the Senate. For a discussion of it, see Alexander,
The Obey-Railsbacl Bill: Its Genesis and Early Histony, 22 ARan. L.. REv. 653
(1980).
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C. A Legislative Proposal
When pressure builds in one area of a system, in some cases it
may be best alleviated not by treating it directly but by allow-
ing an outlet for the pressure elsewhere in the system. This prin-
ciple constitutes the basis upon which this Comment's proposal
is built. Faced with constitutional barriers to restrictions on inde-
pendent expenditures on one side, and statutory and systemic bar-
riers to the expeditious, effective enforcement of coordinated ex-
penditure limitations on another side, it may be difficult to impose a
much greater degree of direct control on "independent" committees
than that which already exists. Therefore, this Comment proposes
a partial solution, intended to reduce the importance of some of
the factors that have led to the increasing impact of these inde-
pendent activities.
1. Contribution and Expenditure Limitations
The essence of this Comment's proposal is that Congress should
allow contributions to be made directly to the candidate or his
authorized committees during the general election as well as during
the primaries. To implement this idea, several legislative changes
would have to be made.206 First, the expenditure limitations on
presidential candidates who accept public funding in the general
election should be raised significantly, and the limitation on the
amount that the candidate's political party can spend on his cam-
paign should be repealed, except as subject to the new overall
limitation. Temporarily, public funding levels should remain the
same, but Congress should reevaluate the $20,000,000 level
207 of
206 For description and citation of the existing legislative provisions that are
addressed below, see notes 66-94 supra & accompanying text
207 See note 86 supra & accompanying text. The derivation of the $20 million
figure is not made entirely clear by the legislative history. The original Senate bill
proposing amendments to the FECA in 1974 provided for public funding in presi-
dential general elections of an amount equalling 15 cents multiplied by the voting
age population. According to the Senate Report accompanying the bill, the figure
in 1974 would have been $21,250,000. S. REP. No. 689, supra note 11, at 26,
reprinted in [1974) U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 5587, 5612. The House version,
which was ultimately adopted in conference, provided instead for a fiat $20 million,
plus an adjustment for inflation. The House Report states simply that the House
amendment "eliminates the formula under which candidates of a major party would
receive 15 cents multiplied by" the voting age population. H.R. REP. No. 1239,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1974), reprinted in FEDEiAL ELECtION CominissioN,
LEGIsLATr HSTORY OF FomuL. ELE= N CATA GN ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1974,
at 631, 667 (1974). It seems reasonable to assume that Congress simply preferred
the more rounded figure; regardless, however, the source of the original 15 cents
figure remains uncertain.
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public funding in an attempt to determine the threshold amount of
funding necessary to run a national campaign. 208  Second, candi-
dates who opt for public funding should be allowed to accept pri-
vate funding as well, so long as they do not exceed the new ex-
penditure limitation. Third, the contribution limitations should
be adjusted by raising the limit on individual contributions to a
candidate in any calendar year from the current $1,000 to $5,000,
thereby equalizing the amounts a person can contribute to a candi-
date and to unauthorized political committees. Fourth, limits should
be placed on the aggregate amounts that independent committees
may contribute to all of their supported candidates in any given
calendar year.
2. "Floors, Not Ceilings"
The idea expressed above, that the government should provide
grants to presidential candidates that supplement private money, is.
not a new one. Political scientists expert in the field of campaign
financing have long advocated, in varying formulations, that "floors,
not ceilings," should be enacted.209 As Professor Alexander has
explained, "[f]loors mean the provision of government funds to en-
sure minimum access of the candidate to the electorate. Beyond
that level, candidates can spend as much private money as they can
raise." 210 This concept is accepted in a number of western democ-
racies.211 The proposal advanced here incorporates a combination
of public and private funding, but because it would retain an upper
208 Such a task is difficult, but not necessarily impossible. Political consultants
are able to estimate a threshold for a statewide campaign in a state as large as
Pennsylvania. Telephone interview with Thomas Sweitzer of The Campaign Group,
a Philadelphia political consulting firm (Jan. 6, 1981). Also, researchers are begin-
ning to identify and measure the ability of media consumers to absorb and utilize
information received through advertising and news programs. See, e.g., Patterson
& McClure, Television and the Less Interested Voter: The Costs of an Informed
Electorate, 425 ArNALs 88 (May 1976); Simon & Arndt, The Shape of the Adver-
tising Response Function, 26 J. ADv. RES. 11 (1980). At a minimum, Congress
should reassess the $20 million figure, and in doing so should focus on the rising
costs of campaigning rather than on the general rise of the Consumer Price Index.
See note 86 supra & accompanying text. This modification has been suggested
elsewhere. See H. Alexander, Background Paper 14-15 (prepared for the Presiden-
tial Finance Officers' Conference, sponsored by the Citizen's Research Foundation,
Washington, D.C., Dec. 5, 1980) (on ifie with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review).
209See, e.g., D. ADAsAN-Y & G. AGREE, POLITICAL MoNEY 60-62 (1975);
H AL.-,mi, MoNEY iN Po~rncs 93-95 (1972); D. DuNiT, FneAcinG PnsF-
D=nTL.. CawAIcNs 150-52, 155 (1972).
210 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976: Hearings, supra note
187, at 178, 181 (1976) (statement of Herbert Alexander), reprinted in FEnE~rA
ErEcrroN CoMmirssroN, supra note 15, at 184, 187.
211 Id. Several countries provide funding to political parties instead of indi-
vidual candidates.
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limit on candidates' expenditures it could be more accurately de-
scribed as employing both floors and ceilings.
Partly as a result of the uproar over Watergate, Congress de-
bated the adoption of partial subsidization plans when it considered
amending the FECA in 1974.212 Senator Adlai Stevenson proposed
an amendment to the Senate bill to amend the FECA that would
have established a system of partial public financing,213 under which
a presidential candidate would receive an entitlement of forty per-
cent of his expenditures in the general election, plus matching
funds for those contributions not exceeding $250.214 In its context
as a proposed amendment to a bill providing for full public
financing combined with limitations on both individual contribu-
tions and expenditures, the Stevenson proposal was widely regarded
as a compromise measure designed to make the elections bill more
passable.215 The amendment was rejected, but as events turned out,
it was not necessary for the passage of the bill.
Two years later, Buckley v. Valeo struck down the limitation
on independent expenditures.210 Although there was some anticipa-
tion of the effect that this would have on campaign financing,
Congress gave no consideration to a partial funding system in its
rush to accommodate the election laws to the Buckley decision.
217
3. Promotion of the Policies of the Act
Adoption of this Comment's proposal would serve to promote
several policies underlying the Act. First, by providing for the
direct participation of individuals in the funding of the major
presidential candidates' general election campaigns, it would help
serve the "[f]ull enjoyment of the First Amendment rights of in-
dividuals and groups." 218  Second, by funnelling more funds
212 See the discussion of the Hart plan and the Stevenson-Mathias plan in 31
CONG. Q. 1877, 1885 (1973), reprinted in U.S. SENATE SELEcT Com.s ON PREsI-
DETi7AL CAMP1AGN AcTrars, EI-xcnoN RFxORm: BAsc PREFENCES 201 (1973).
213 120 CONG. REc. 10340 (1974), reprinted in FEDERAx. EL CIN CoMMISsioN,
supra note 207, at 438.
214 Id. 10341, reprinted in FEDERAL ELECTrON CommissiozT, supra note 207,
at 439.
215 120 CONG. REc. 10343 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey), reprinted in
FEDERAL ELECTION CommissIoN, supra note 207, at 440.
2 1 6 For a discussion of the Buckley opinion, see text accompanying notes 112-23
-supra.
217 See text accompanying notes 13 & 14 supra.
218 H.R. Rm. No. 917, supra note 15, at 5, reprinted in FEDERAL ELECTION
CoMmIssON, supra note 15, at 797, 805.
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through the candidate's party organization, it would "encourage
a specific type of contribution to such candidates in order to
strengthen the party system." 219  Third, by retaining an upper
limit on a candidate's spending, it could help keep a continuing
check on "spiraling campaign costs" 220 while freeing candidates
from the current limits that are unrealistically low. 2 2 1  Fourth, by
drawing funds away from independent committees, thereby de-
creasing the relative impact of independent expenditures in election
campaigning, the proposal could serve to prevent "an infinite pro-
liferation of political committees which [are] ostensibly separate
entities but which [are] in fact a means for advancing a candidate's
campaign." 222
Fifth, the proposal would perhaps decrease the potentially
great disparity in expenditures that can result in a given election
from the existence of large independent expenditures for a par-
ticular candidate in conjunction with the ceiling on authorized
expenditures by all candidates. It would thus promote the legis-
lative objective of minimizing disparity in spending between the
Proposals that encompass a matching grant system, such as for contributions of
up to $250, could actually yield greater citizen participation by encouraging parties
to seek support from numerous smaller contributors. See, e.g., Senator Stevenson's
proposed amendment to the FECA Amendments of 1974, 120 CONG. REc. 10341
(1974), reprinted in FEDEA L E.-zoN Commrssiobr, supra note 207, at 438;
H. A= wmn, supra note 209, at 297; Agree, Public Financing, 425 ANNALs 134,
137 (May 1976). A matching system has been criticized, however, on the ground
that it may tend to magnify the amount by which one candidate outspends another.
In any case, a matching system would not be a necessary component of a plan to,
provide an outlet for contributions directly to the candidate during the general
election.
219 H.R. REP. No. 917, supra note 15, at 6, reprinted in FED EuLECrIo-
CommissIObr, supra note 15, at 797, 806.
220 H.R. REP. No. 1239, supra note 207, at 6, reprinted in FzmnEAL ELxcnoN-
COMssION, supra note 207, at 631, 640.
22 1 A number of campaign finance commentators have suggested that the cur-
rent spending levels may be too low. See H. Ar. z.AmN, PoLrrcAL FiNAcmc 39
(1972); D. DuNN, FINs.c-om PaEsmEN-rmr CAmPAIGNs 150 (1972); G. THAYER,
WHO SHAmus TiE MoN Y TREE? 274 (1973).
222 H.R. REP. No. 917, supra note 15, at 5, reprinted in FEDERAL ELECTIoN
CommissIoN, supra note 15, at 797, 805. It is assumed here that, first, the total
contributions during a campaign are to some extent finite, and, second, many con-
tributors would rather give directly to 'a candidate than aid him indirectly through
an independent political committee. Of course, contributors could still give to both,
but even if only some did not, the relative impact of the independent groups would
decline. The type of empirical inquiry necessary to test the validity of the stated
assumptions is beyond the scope of this Comment. A suggestion, at least, that the
second assumption is valid can be found in the fundraising appeals of the inde-
pendent committees. See text accompanying note 47 supra. The first assumption
is lent support by research suggesting that, even though modem fundraising tech-
niques may be able to exploit new sources of funds, the funding pool is not bottom-
less. See Adamany, supra note 188, at 19.
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candidates. 2 3 Spending disparities would continue to exist under
the proposal, both because of independent expenditures and be-
cause candidates would raise different amounts of private funds to
spend as they see fit. Disparities in spending would be minimized,
however, to the extent that a candidate who does not have inde-
pendent support could himself take the initiative in reducing the
differential caused by the independent committees.
Most importantly, the proposal could help to reduce the pos-
sibilities for corruption, or the appearance of corruption, in federal
campaigns. The greatest source of potential corruption in the in-
dependent committees is not the contributors to the committees,
for which the contribution limitations remain applicable, but
rather the committee managers who may be able to aggregate and
spend millions of dollars on behalf of a candidate. To the extent
that contributions would be given directly to the candidate, the
accumulation of large sums of money controlled by independent
committee managers would not occur to the same degree. It would
thus seem to be less likely that "implicit obligations" would arise
in connection with the independent expenditures. For the same
reasons, an appearance of "subversion" of the election laws by these
committees would be less likely.
In addition to furthering several important policies behind
the FECA, adoption of this Comment's proposal could spawn other
benefits. Perhaps the most likely is that, while overall spending
on a presidential campaign would increase, a greater percentage of
expenditures would be by authorized committees. The candidates
would thereby gain greater control over their own campaigns, be-
cause they would control more of the funds expended on their
behalf. They would also probably engage in more fundraising
during the general election campaign than they presently do.
The effect that adoption of the proposed changes would have
on the survival of the independent committees is hard to predict.
It would neither eliminate them nor even inhibit them directly.
The proposal merely reduces the need for them. Ideological com-
mittees may withstand these changes more easily than candidate-
223 The House Committee on House Administration made the following state-
ment in its report on FECA 1974:
While independent expenditures may occur quite apart from the official
campaign effort, they can and often do have a substantial impact on the
outcome. Absent a limitation on this activity, well-heeled groups and
individuals could spend substantial sums and thus severely compromise the
limitations on spending by the supported candidate Limself.
H.R. REP. No. 1239, supra note 207, at 6, reprinted in FmxmtL ELE o N CoM-
MIEssIoN, supra note 207, at 631, 640.
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specific committees. The potential benefit flowing from adoption
of the proposal is that as the need for surrogate campaign commit-
tees declines, it is more likely that remaining independent com-
mittees would be truly independent.
Finally, under the proposal, enforcement would not be any
more difficult than it already is, and, as George Agree explains,
might actually be easier:
[P]artial public funding makes it possible to require that
subsidies be segregated from other funds and used only
for easily verifiable kinds of expenses, such as metered
postage, printing bills, broadcasting time, billboards, and
telephone charges. Salaries, personal expenses, petty cash,
and other difficult-to-trace disbursements could be ex-
cluded from payment with government funds. In a system
combining the use of both government and private money,
it even would be possible not to give candidates the sub-
sidy funds at all. The candidates could be required to
submit certified bills for approved expenses which the
government would then pay directly, as is done in Puerto
Rico.2
24
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Congress may find it permissible and beneficial to
reenact a limitation on the expenditures of independent political
committees. For now, however, such a limitation cannot pass con-
stitutional muster, because there is insufficient evidence available
that demonstrates the existence of problems of real and apparent
corruption created by independent committees. Rather than wait
until these problems have a chance to develop in the presidential
election context, however, Congress should attempt to circumvent
them by raising the overall expenditure limitation on presidential
candidates and by permitting contributions to be made to them
directly during the general election. The desired effect of this
proposal would be to divert contributions toward the candidate
that might otherwise have flowed to the independent committees.
224 Agree, Public Financing after the Supreme Court Decision, 425 AiNNuS
134, 140 (May 1976).
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